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Newspaper Immunity in Reporting
Judicial Proceedings
James W. Adams*
O RDINARILY, there is a legally enforceable right to recover damages
for libelous statements. On the other hand, newspapers enjoy a
constitutionally guaranteed right of free press. Free press however is
not synonymous with a license to libel' and newspapers normally stand
in no better position than any other member of the community in de-
fense of libel suits.2
The law does recognize in varying degrees, depending on the juris-
diction involved, the existence of a privilege which affords newspapers
immunity in libel suits under certain conditions when they report judi-
cial proceedings. This permitted the writers of the Restatement of the
Law of Torts3 to conclude that a defamatory newspaper report of a judi-
cial proceeding is privileged provided the report is a fair and accurate
account of the proceeding and is not made solely for the purpose of caus-
ing harm to the defamed person.4 The privilege applies only where the
proceeding reported is a judicial one, that is, one involving some official
action.5 Reports of both ex parte and inter partes proceedings are in-
cluded in the privilege.0 Moreover, the privilege is distinguishable from
other qualified privileges in that it is not lost even if the newspaper
knows that the defamatory statement is false.7
The standard of fairness and accuracy necessary to preserve the
privilege is satisfied if the report conveys to the reader a substantially
correct account of the proceeding.' If the report eliminates part of the
proceeding, misplaces the order of the proceeding, or is otherwise edited
so that an erroneous impression is conveyed to the reader, the report may
be accurate, but it is not fair. The relative completeness of the coverage
afforded each side in the controversy can be a factor in determining fair-
ness.s Examples of unfair reporting suggested in the Restatement include
the report of defamatory testimony by a witness and subsequent failure
* B.S., The Citadel; Third year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School; Patent
Agent, the Lubrizol Corp.
1 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,
266 (1952).
2 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander § 121 (1948).
3 Restatement of Torts, § 611 (1st ed. 1938).
4 Ibid.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
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to report the presentation of evidence tending to discredit this testimony,
a defamatory headline which is qualified only in the text of the report,
and otherwise reporting the portions of the proceeding which contain
defamatory matter and failing to report later proceedings which vindicate
the person defamed.10
If the reporter chooses to make additions and comments to the re-
port, to impute corrupt motives, or to question the veracity of the parties
to the proceeding, he removes the report from the scope of the privilege
associated with reporting judicial proceedings"' although the report may
be protected under the immunity afforded privileged criticism.12 To be
privileged, the criticism must concern those activities of another which
are matters of legitimate public concern. 3 Even if the criticism is de-
famatory, it is privileged provided that it is based upon a true statement
of facts or facts otherwise known or available to the public; that it is
the actual opinion of the critic; and that it is not made solely to harm the
person defamed. 14 Otherwise defamatory criticism of judges, prosecutors,
litigants, witnesses, jurors, magistrates, and others who participate in the
administration of justice is privileged if the criticism meets these require-
ments. 15
The Restatement recognizes two principal sources of immunity
afforded newspapers in reporting judicial proceedings: (1) the qualified
privilege to publish fair and accurate reports of judicial proceedings, and
(2) the qualified privilege to criticise the activities of those involved in
the proceeding. This general state of the law exists because courts or
legislatures have preferred to safeguard and extend free press rather
than to protect an individual from defamation. The term "extend" is
appropriate since the privilege has not existed always.
An inherent characteristic of our law is that, in creating or recog-
nizing a legally enforceable right, the right created or recognized in-
evitably comes into conflict with another legally enforceable right usu-
ally necessitating a judicial or legislative preference of one at the ex-
pense of the other to resolve the conflict. Free press has a penchant for
conflicting with other rights. In the problem under consideration, free
press conflicts with the right of the individual to recover damages for
libelous statements. Similarly, in the reporting of judicial proceedings
and matters incident to these proceedings, free press often comes into
conflict with the right to a fair trial. 16
10 Id. at Comment (d)
11 Ibid.
12 Id. at § 606.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Id. § 607.
16 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
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A newspaper report of a trial may libel one or more persons without
abrogating the fairness of the trial. Likewise, a newspaper report may
jeopardize the right to a fair trial without constituting libel. It would
appear that newspaper immunity from libel suits arising out of the re-
porting of judicial proceedings and the adverse effects of such reporting
on fair trials are unrelated problems. To the extent that both problems
require evaluation of free press, they are at least related so that useful
reference can be made from time to time to the comments regarding free
press in the current "free press-fair trial" controversy.
Ohio View in Reporting Judicial Proceedings
By statute, Ohio has explicitly defined its position on the immunity
afforded newspapers in reporting judicial proceedings other than trials:
The publication of a fair and impartial report of the return of
any indictment, the arrest of any person accused of crime, or the
filing of any affidavit, pleading, or other document in any criminal
or civil cause in any court of competent jurisdiction, or of a fair and
impartial report of the contents thereof, is privileged, unless it is
proved that the same was published maliciously, or that the defend-
ant has refused or neglected to publish in the same manner in which
the publication complained of appeared, a reasonable written ex-
planation or contradiction thereof by the plaintiff, or that the pub-
lisher has refused, upon request of the plaintiff, to publish the sub-
sequent determination of such suit or action. This section and section
2317.04 of the Revised Code do not authorize the publication of
blasphemous or indecent matter.
1 7
This statute grants newspapers a qualified privilege to report even
the fringe areas of judicial proceedings, that is, criminal arrest, the filing
of affidavits, pleadings and other documents, as well as the contents of
these documents. Ohio courts hold that pleadings, affidavits, testimony,
and the like produced in judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged
if in any way relevant or material to the issue.' s Thus, defamatory mat-
ter can be incorporated in a pleading which is filed with the appropriate
court where the newspapers can then obtain and report it. The one de-
famed usually has no remedy since the publications involved are privi-
leged.
The Ohio statute requires that the report be "fair and impartial"
which seems to be equivalent in purpose to the "fair and accurate" stand-
ards set forth by the Restatement. However, in Ohio, if a report is made
maliciously, the privilege is lost whereas the Restatement requires that
17 Ohio Rev. Code, Evidence, § 2317.05 (1953).
18 Lanning v. Christy, 30 Ohio St. 115, 27 Am. R. 431 (1876); Liles v. Gaster, 42 Ohio
St. 631 (1885); Rudin v. Fauver, 9 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 289 (Ct. C.P. Lorain County
1909), aff'd, 83 Ohio St. 468, 94 N.E. 1114 (1910); Erie County Farmers' Ins. Co. v.
Crecelius, 122 Ohio St. 210, 171 N.E. 97 (1930); Buehrer v. Provident Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 123 Ohio St. 264, 175 N.E. 25 (1931).
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the report be published solely to cause harm before the privilege is lost.
Presumably then, a report jointly motivated by malice and a legitimate
desire to inform the public would not be privileged in Ohio. The term
"1maliciously" was used in the prior Ohio statute19 which was substan-
tially identical with the present one. As used in the prior statute, it was
held to mean "express malice" and to give rise to a rebuttable presump-
tion of "no malice." 20 The burden of proof then falls on the plaintiff
and, at best, it will be difficult to establish express malice as a motivating
force behind the publication of the report.
The additional requirements specified by the present statute as pre-
requisites to immunity seem more meaningful to the one defamed. To
qualify, the newspaper cannot neglect or refuse to publish, in the same
manner as the defamatory publication, a reasonable written explanation
or contradiction by the plaintiff. These provisions do not deter or pre-
vent libel nor do they avoid or compensate the injury to reputation in-
herent in libel. They do, however, provide a public means by which the
one defamed can defend himself and possibly lessen the consequences
of the libel.
The present statute does not reflect the earlier opinions of the Ohio
courts. The first decision by the Ohio supreme court dealing with the
question of newspaper immunity in reporting judicial proceedings falling
with the terms of the present statute was handed down in 1860 in Cin-
cinnati Gazette Co. v. Timberlake.2 1 There the court was confronted with
a libel suit in which the newspaper, The Cincinnati Gazette, defended its
report of a warrant for Timberlake's arrest and his subsequent arrest as
being privileged. On August 8, 1856, the newspaper reported under the
heading "Swindling" that Timberlake had been arrested on a charge of
petit larceny as a result of an arrest warrant charging that he had bought
land warrants for ninety-five dollars but refused to pay more than
seventy-five dollars after the warrants were delivered. Timberlake was
jailed, but was acquitted the following day in police court. The trial
court had advised the jury that the privilege claimed did not extend to
preliminary and ex parte proceedings and charged that truth of the pub-
lication was the only defense.
The Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged in dictum that there was
... no doubt that a full, fair, and impartial report of a judicial trial,
had in open court, where the parties interested have an opportunity
of asserting and vindicating their rights, may be published with im-
punity. Such reports, unaccompanied by malicious and defamatory
comments, have always been held privileged.
22
19 Ohio General Code, § 11343-2 (1953).
20 Heimlich v. Dispatch Printing Co., 18 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 505 (1915), aff'd, 60 Ohio
App. 394 (1916).
21 10 Ohio St. 549 (1860).
22 Id. at 552, 78 Am. Dec. at 285.
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The court then directed its attention to whether the privilege extended
to preliminary proceedings, that is, proceedings prior to trial. Acknowl-
edging that the constitutions of both the United States and Ohio guaran-
tee free press, the court noted that the latter also values reputation. 2
The court contemplating no inconsistency in free press and the protection
of reputation, held that no privilege existed for reporting proceedings
prior to trial and that the only defense to such reports was truth.
The Maryland Supreme Court was called upon to decide the same
issue in 1877 in the case of McBee v. Fulton.24 After reviewing many of
the same English and American authorities considered earlier by the
Ohio court in Cincinnati Gazette Co., the Maryland court extended a
qualified privilege to newspapers in reporting ex parte and preliminary
judicial proceedings. The Maryland court was apparently influenced by
some English and New York cases not available at the time of the Ohio
court's decisions.
In 1900, the Ohio legislature amended the statute dealing with libel
so that newspapers were better able to defend themselves against libel
suits arising out of reports of judicial proceedings. The revised statute
destroyed the presumption of malice ordinarily associated with libelous
publications if a retraction was published upon request and if the original
publication was made in good faith with reasonable grounds for believing
it to be true.25 If these conditions were met, the statute required proof
of special damages or actual malice in order to recover damages in a libel
suit.
The Post Publishing Co. asked the Sixth Circuit court to construe
the statute so that its ameliorating provisions became effective when
a retraction was published regardless of whether the retraction was pub-
lished at the request of the one defamed. The court stated that this con-
struction of the statute would raise questions of its constitutionality in
view of the protection afforded reputation in the Ohio constitution. This
construction would permit the newspaper to limit its liability without
the consent of the one defamed, because, as the court noted, proof of
special damages in libel suits was almost impossible. Therefore, it was
held that the one defamed had to request retraction for the retraction to
have the consequences stated in the statute. The requested retraction
served as a waiver of remedy and was not barred by the Ohio con-
stitution.
26
The Ohio Supreme Court was not so generous. It held the statute
unconstitutional in Byers v. The Meridian Printing Co.2 7 A Cleveland
23 Ohio Const., Art. I, § 16 (1851).
24 47 Md. 403, 28 Am. Rep. 465 (1877).
25 Ohio Rev. St., § 5094 (1900); 94 Ohio L. 295.
26 Post Publishing Co. v. Butler, 137 F. 723 (6th Cir. 1905).
27 84 Ohio St. 408, 95 N.E. 917 (1911).
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newspaper reported that an arrest warrant had been sworn against the
plaintiff, a local attorney, charging him with perjury. In fact, the justice
of the peace had convinced the would-be complainant that he had no
cause of action and the oath in support of the warrant was never signed.
A retraction of the report was published upon request of the attorney.
The newspaper, citing McBee, argued that the publication would be
privileged in all jurisdictions other than Ohio and that Cincinnati Gazette
Co., was decided incorrectly. The Supreme Court was not impressed and
swept away these contentions by saying that the reasoning in their de-
cision was sound even if the authorities were questionable. Again the
court held that there was no privilege to report preliminary and ex parte
judicial proceedings and quoted with approval the reasons given by the
Michigan Supreme Court 28 to sustain a similar decision in denying a
privilege to report pleadings.
... One of the reasons why parties are privileged from suit for accu-
sations made in their pleadings is that the pleadings are addressed
to courts where facts can be fairly tried, and to no other readers. If
pleadings and other documents can be published to the world by
any one who gets access to them, no more effectual way of doing
malicious mischief with impunity could be devised than filing papers
containing false and scurrilous charges, and getting those printed as
news. The public has no right to any information on private suits
until they come up for hearing or action in open court; and, when
any publication is made involving such matters, they possess no
privilege, and the publication must rest on either non-libelous char-
acter or truth to defend it. 29
The Ohio legislature in 1911, the same year that Byers was decided,
passed additional legislation 30 explicitly extending a qualified privilege
to report preliminary judicial proceedings. The 1911 statute was sub-
stantially identical with the one currently in force. 31
One of the first attacks upon the 1911 statute failed.3 2 In its decision,
the Franklin Common Pleas Court noted both Cincinnati Gazette Co.
and Byers, supra, but found them not controlling because the statute in
question was very different from the one found unconstitutional. First,
the court decided that the statute had changed the rule of these cases
and extended the privilege beyond what judicial precedent had formerly
recognized. Further, the court found no constitutional conflict since
newspapers were privileged to report only those documents which were
filed in courts where they became public property and available to all to
examine and discuss. In other words, newspapers were only privileged
28 Park v. Free Press Co., 72 Mich. 560, 40 N.W. 731 (1888).
29 Id., at 586, 40 N.W. at 734, Quoted at 84 Ohio St. at 418; 95 N.E. at 918.
30 Ohio General Code, § 11343-2; 102 Ohio L. 95 (1911).
31 Supra note 17.
32 See Heimlich v. Dispatch Printing Co. supra note 20.
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to report that which was already available. With this understanding of
the statute, the court found that a newspaper report of an arrest warrant
charging an attorney with perjury was privileged.
This view was upheld on appeal to the Court of Appeals for Frank-
lin County.33 However, the decision of the appellate court specified that
the privilege presumes no comments on the part of the publisher.
The current statute permitted another Ohio appellate court to hold
that the Mansfield News-Journal was immune in a libel suit involving
the following circumstances. 34 The newspaper reported on November 28,
1953, that the plaintiff had been arrested on a warrant charging him with
the rape of a twelve-year old girl. Actually, the victim was twenty-four
and the arrest of the plaintiff proved to be a case of mistaken identity.
The newspaper reporter "learned" the age of the victim from police per-
sonnel in charge of records, not from an inspection of the warrant itself.
On November 7, 1953, the newspaper published a full account of the
facts, including plaintiff's complete exoneration. Under such circum-
stances, the report, though erroneous, was privileged.
However, the privilege afforded under the present statute is not
absolute. When a newspaper decided to translate language referring to
"unnatural" sexual behavior, as used in an answer filed in a divorce
case, into "sex perversion," the court found that this act of interpreting
the language of the answer removed the report from the privilege. 35 The
language "sex perversion" was considered more opprobious than "un-
natural" sexual relations and even to impute sodomy, a crime in Ohio.
This case illustrates the risks associated with interpreting the language
employed in judicial proceedings. It is doubtful that the ordinary reader
would find any meaningful difference between "unnatural" sexual be-
havior and sex perversion (if, in fact, there is any real difference). Thus,
it would seem, that the report could easily have been regarded as fair
and impartial. Perhaps, the lesson to be learned from this case is that
judges may narrowly construe the privilege and any variations in critical
wording will offer them the opportunity to find the report not privileged.
The Ohio statutes are silent on the question whether newspapers are
privileged to report trials. The Revised Code explicitly extends a
privilege to report other judicial proceedings as well as proceedings be-
fore state and municipal legislative or executive bodies, boards, and
officers. This fact, however, is clearly not indicative of any belief on the
part of the legislature that they have withheld the privilege with regard
to reporting trials. Rather, it is indicative of the fact that there has never
been any real question in Ohio as to the existence of this privilege.
33 Ibid.
34 Torski v. Mansfield Journal, 100 Ohio App. 538, 137 N.E. 2d 679, appeal dismissed,
165 Ohio St. 245, 135 N.E. 2d 63 (1956).
35 Williams v. P. W. Publishing Co., 76 Ohio L. Abs. 404, 140 N.E. 2d 809 (Ct. App.
Cuyahoga County 1957).
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The qualified privilege to publish fair and impartial accounts of
trials was recognized in dicta in early decisions by the Ohio Supreme
Court; Cincinnati Gazette Co., in 1860; in Post Publishing Co. v.
Maloney30 in 1893; and in Byers, supra, in 1911. The lower courts in Ohio
have recognized and upheld the privilege since before the turn of the
century. In 1895, a newspaper report of the testimony of a witness was
held privileged, even though the testimony later proved unfounded.3 7 In
1896, relying on the dictum in Post Publishing Co., it was found that a
newspaper was privileged to report the testimony of a discharged house-
keeper, plaintiff in a suit for wages where the plaintiff suggested in her
testimony that her employer had tried to abduct her granddaughter,
a girl of fourteen.
38
Recently, it was held that a fair report of the trial conduct of a judge
was privileged.3 9 Acknowledging that the Revised Code did not specifi-
cally provide any privilege to report trials, the court felt that sections
2317.04 and 2317.05 dealing, respectively, with the privilege to report
governmental and preliminary judicial proceedings pointed the way and
were consistent with prior case law upholding the right to report trials.
Unquestionably, Ohio newspapers enjoy a liberal judicial and legis-
lative attitude that recognizes a qualified privilege to publish fair and
impartial accounts of judicial proceeding. As long as the reports are free
from comment or interpretation on the part of the publisher, the news-
paper will be immune in libel suits resulting from the reports.
Proposed Limitations
Almost invariably, the decisions discussed above sustaining the right
to report judicial proceedings advance either, or both, of two basic rea-
sons to support immunity. First, these proceedings are a matter of public
record available to the public and a fair and impartial newspaper report
merely provides the public with another source of information already
available. The second is based on the constitutional guarantee of free
press. Keeping the public informed on judicial proceedings is considered
more important than protecting the reputation of an individual.
On the surface, it is difficult to quarrel with the basic principles
underlying these reasons. Certainly, free press is an essential ingredient
in a self-governing society. Indeed, the Supreme Court has characterized
a ". . . responsible press as the handmaiden of effective judicial adminis-
36 50 Ohio St. 71, 33 N.E. 921 (1893).
37 Coleman v. Ohio State Journal, 5 Ohio Dec. 579, 7 Ohio N.P. 564 (Franklin C.P.
1895).
38 Parks v. Enquirer Co., 4 Ohio Dec. 184, aff'd, 8 Ohio C. Dec. 621, 16 Ohio C.C.R.
409 (Hamilton C.P. 1896).
39 Driscoll v. Block, 3 Ohio App. 2d 351, 210 N.E. 899 (1965).
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tration . . ." 40 But the Supreme Court has also pointed out that free
press is not an absolute freedom.
41
Free press can be regulated.42 In fact, it is regulated by the very
Federal Constitution which protects it.43 The basic idea underlying free
press is to facilitate the dissemination of ideas, facts, criticisms, warn-
ings, advice, dissent, and the like. This hopefully leads to informed dis-
cussion and positive action so that society will develop and improve.
Presumably, judicial administration also can be improved by this method.
But does piecemeal reporting of a search warrant, an arrest warrant,
an arrest, the jury selection, the day-to-day testimony of each witness,
the admonitions of the judge, the concluding arguments of counsel, the
jury charge, the verdict, and the sentence over a period of days, weeks,
or months promote informed discussion? Or does such reporting result
in a distorted view of the accused, the judicial process, and those in-
volved in its administration? Are false impressions created by the re-
porting of unfounded but privileged testimony really corrected in the
minds of readers by the reporting of subsequent events? Are newspaper
reports responsible? 44 Whether a responsible press is the law's hand-
maiden is irrelevant if the press is not responsible. Are newspapers pri-
marily consumer businesses out to sell a consumer product? When a
business 'depends on consumer acceptance to sell its product, it is in-
clined to furnish the consumer with a product tailored to the consumer's
opinions. In other words, doesn't it make sense to tell the consumer
what he wants to hear-to suggest day after day that the accused did
it? 45 It seems that the answer to these and other questions must be de-
40 Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra note 16.
41 See, for example, Justice Black's dissent in Beauharnais v. Illinois supra note 1.
For a more recent statement of his opinion on this subject, see his dissent in Ginz-
burg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
42 This is illustrated by the decisions in Beauharnais v. Illinois, supra note 1 and
Ginzburg v. U.S., supra note 41.
43 The First Amendment of the Constitution merely forbids Congress to pass laws
".... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .. " It in no way implies that
the Constitution itself cannot define the boundaries of free speech and press. The
Constitutional guarantee of ". . . a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . ."
is just such a limitation. To the extent that free press interferes with the right to an
impartial jury in criminal cases as provided by the Sixth Amendment, it is an un-
constitutional exercise of "free" press proscribed by the Constitution.
It would appear that as to the "free press-fair trial" controversy, newspapers
and other news media have no constitutional basis from which to challenge any
legislation which restricts the reporting of criminal trials or other matters incident
thereto which could reasonably be expected to influence jurors or potential jurors
so that the jury's impartiality would be destroyed. Such legislation as is necessary
to safeguard the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment against infringement by speech
and press are clearly within the authority provided Congress under the "necessary
and proper" clause.
44 For a sampling of "responsible" newspaper reporting, see pages 25-47 of the
American Bar Association report, Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press
(tentative draft, 1966) also known as the Reardon Report.
45 Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra note 15. See also newspaper reports quoted with
decision.
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termined and taken into account when considering whether newspapers
should be afforded a qualified privilege to report judicial proceedings at
the expense of personal reputation.
To imply that a fair and impartial newspaper report of a judicial
proceeding does no additional harm to reputation since it publishes only
what is already known to the public seems to deny reality. Common
sense tells any reasonable person that, were it not for the news media,
he would know of few, if any, pending criminal or civil actions. While
such information may be available, he has neither the interest nor the
time to find it. As it is, the newspapers advise him, along with tens of
thousands of others in the community, of each step in many judicial pro-
ceedings. In a suitable case, the news media "inform" the entire nation
of each step in a judicial proceeding. Instead of a few dozen people or
at most a few hundred people knowing of a given judicial proceeding,
the whole community is advised of the fact-friends, enemies, relatives,
business associates, employees, employers, customers, clients, creditors,
neighbors, phone-calling crackpots, everybody. Again common sense re-
quires the conclusion that whatever harm to the reputation is attributa-
ble to defamatory matter published or made available through a judicial
proceeding is compounded by a newspaper report of the proceeding.
If newspapers were granted a qualified privilege to report judicial
proceedings after completion of trial or disposition without trial, there
could be no serious complaint that free press was abridged. Newspapers
would still be free to report judicial proceedings as they saw fit. They
would not be forbidden to report judicial proceedings before the com-
pletion of trial or disposition without trial. They simply would not be
granted any immunity for reports published prior to this time. The ab-
sence of any privilege to report at the earlier stages of judicial proceed-
ings could be conducive to more responsible journalism during this pe-
riod. At the same time, persons injured by libelous statements contained
in reports published without a privilege could recover damages accord-
ing to the general rules applicable to damages in libel suits.
Upon completion of the trial or disposition of the proceeding without
trial, the newspaper would be privileged to publish a fair and impartial
account of the proceeding under the general guidelines currently in effect
in Ohio. An account of the proceeding at this time should be more infor-
mative to the readers as they will have the complete summary of events
to evaluate-the "big picture" as opposed to a series of "snapshots" pre-
sented over varying periods of time. Having the result of the trial to
consider when the other events of the trial are being evaluated is likely
to produce less distorted impressions in the minds of the readers con-
cerning the judicial process and the persons involved.
On the other hand, the person allegedly defamed by a fair and im-
partial report of a proceeding at the completion of the proceeding would
May, 1968
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not be in a very good position to complain. If the facts and evidence
establish nothing defamatory, then the overall tenor of the report should
not be defamatory, or it will not be privileged.
This approach to an accommodation between free press and prevent-
ing unnecessary injury to reputation is analogous in many respects to
recommendations recently approved by the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association,4 6 and contained in the Association's report
Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press.47 After finding that
present newspaper reporting "may destroy the reputation of one who is
innocent and may seriously endanger the right to a fair trial," 48 the re-
port writers recommended that certain matters should not be reported
until after trial or disposition without trial.49 Comment and criticism at
this time was believed sufficient to foster the improvement of judicial
administration through free press.
Free press would remain unfettered since no restriction whatever is
imposed upon newspaper reports of judicial proceedings. The only re-
strictions resulting from the postponement of immunity would be self-
imposed by the newspapers. Self-imposed restrictions are not forbidden
by either the federal or state constitutions. In fact, self-imposed re-
straint should be the watchword of a responsible free press.
At the same time, reputation would be afforded greater protection.
Damages could be recovered for libelous statements published before
the qualified privilege became effective. Moreover, postponement of the
effectiveness of the privilege would diminish the adverse effects which
accompany the premature publication, for example, where earlier pro-
ceedings contained defamatory matter subsequently proved unfounded.
The proposed limitation on the qualified privilege to report judicial
proceedings requires amending section 2317.05 of the code (1) to include
reporting of trials and (2) to postpone the operation of the privilege
until the end of trial or disposition without trial. Nothing more would
be required. The standards to qualify for the privilege as now recognized
would remain unchanged otherwise.
46 The New York Times, City Edition, Vol. CXVII, No. 40204, reported February 20,
1968, on pages 1 and 35 that the House of Delegates had adopted the recommenda-
tions of the Reardon Report at their midwinter meeting in Chicago on February 19,
1968.
47 The Reardon Report, supra note 44.
48 Id. at 16.
49 Id. at 8: recommendation 3.1 provides for the exclusion of the public from all or
part of the pre-trial proceedings upon a motion by the defendant and at 12: recom-
mendation 3.5 provides for exclusion of the public from any portion of the trial held
in the absence of the jury upon a motion by the defendant. As to 3.5, the Reardon
Report specifically notes that Ohio may have trouble with this procedure since an
Ohio court has already held that the news media cannot be excluded from trials.
E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E. 2d 896, appeal dismissed,
164 Ohio St. 261, 130 N.E. 2d 701 (1955).
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Conclusion
Modification of the present Ohio law as suggested represents only
a minor departure from the existing law. Yet it could facilitate a de-
sirable accommodation between free press and an important individual
right-the enjoyment of good reputation.
In addition, the modification could prove to be a worthwhile step
in preserving the right to a fair trial. It is likely that the future will see
a growing conflict between fair trial and free press with fair trial being
the eventual winner. Facing such dim prospects, newspapers may be in
a mood to accept self-imposed restrictions with a little inducement. Self-
imposed restraint could be reflected in less reporting of preliminary pro-
ceedings or more responsible reporting. Either would decrease the like-
lihood that a newspaper report would adversely affect the right to a fair
trial.
Admittedly the benefits ascribed to the modification are conjectural
but they are at least possibilities. If any one of them actually could be
achieved or facilitated through the modification, then the modification
would be worthwhile. The "harm" which would flow from the modifica-
tion may be a temporary delay in "informing" the public. This "harm"
can be offset by the improved accuracy and quality possible in a report
published at the conclusion of the proceeding where the entire record,
including the result, is available for evaluation.
In short, the modification seems sound.
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